We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable routing flow games and also job allocation games. The congestion of a resource is the sum of the weights of the players that use it and the player's cost function is the sum of the utilities of the resources on its strategy. The social cost is the total weighted sum of the player's costs. The quality of Nash equilibria is determined by the price of anarchy (P oA) which expresses how much worse is the social outcome in the worst equilibrium versus the optimal coordinated solution. In the literature the predominant work has only been on games with polynomial utility costs, where it has been proven that the price of anarchy is bounded by the degree of the polynomial. However, no results exist on general bounds for non-polynomial utility functions.
Introduction
We consider non-cooperative congestion games on a set of resources which are shared among players. A player's strategy consists of a subset (or all) of the resources where it applies a fixed weight. Strategies of players are pure in the sense that each player picks one strategy among a set of available strategies. The resource utilization is unsplittable within a strategy, since a player applies the same weight on each resource. The congestion of a resource is simply the sum of the weights of the players that use it. The utility of each resource is a function of its congestion. Each player selfishly minimizes its own cost which is the sum of the utilities of all the resources along its strategy.
We examine pure Nash equilibria which are game states where each player has chosen a locally optimal strategy from which there is no better alternative strategy. Rosenthal [18] shows that if all players have the same weight then pure Nash equilibria always exist. There may be multiple Nash equilibria for the same game. The quality of a Nash equilibrium is measured with respect to the social cost function which is simply the weighted sum of the all the players' costs. We measure the impact of the selfishness of the players with the price of anarchy which is the ratio of the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium versus the coordinated optimal social cost.
Resource congestion games can represent network flow games and job distribution games. In networks, each resource corresponds to a link. A player with weight w represents a routing request from a source node to a destination node of demand w which is fulfilled along a path of the network. The utility cost of the player relates to the delay for sending the demand in the network along the chosen route. In job distribution games, each resource represents a machine. Each player has a job that consists of small sub-tasks that can execute at each node. The weight of the player w relates to the work to be assigned to each machine in order to execute the job. The cost of the player relates to the delay to finish its job. In both the network and job games, the price of anarchy represents the impact of selfishness to the overall performance of the system, which in one case is the total network delay, and in the other the total work to execute all jobs.
Congestion games were introduced and studied in [16, 18] . Most of the literature considers linear or polynomial utility functions. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [12] introduced the notion of price of anarchy in the specific parallel link networks model in which they provide the bound P oA = 3/2. Roughgarden and Tardos [22] provided the first result for splittable flows in general networks in which they showed that P oA ≤ 4/3. Pure equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [2, 4, 10, 5, 13, 24] for classic congestion games and their variations of botteleck games (where the cost is determined by the maximum congested edge), and with splittable flow in [19, 20, 22, 23] . Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17] , and with splittable flow in [6, 8] .
2 Contributions: Functional Characterization of PoA Boundedness
. .} denote a class of arbitrary non-decreasing latency cost functions. 
We also define our notion of boundedness for the Price of Anarchy.
Definition 2. The Price of Anarchy of a congestion game G is bounded if it does not arbitrarily increase with the number of players.
Under our notion of boundedness, the Price of Anarchy depends only on intrinsic game parameters such as the parameters of the latency cost function, player strategies etc. but is independent of the number of players. Consider for example a game with 2 resources and n players who can use either resource. The P oA is 1 and independent of n. In this paper, we prove the existence of a large class of latency functions for which there exist games in which the P oA increases with the number of players while other network parameters such as network topology or number of resources, player weights and cost functions remain fixed.
Let G be an unsplittable congestion game with player weights derived from weight set W ⊆ R + and latency cost functions derived from L. We assume that W is bounded by w = (max i ∈ W ) representing the weight of the largest player. For any function l k () ∈ L, define the set of ordered triples
As per the usual convention, for any ordered triple (j, t, i) ∈ R 3 , we denote (j, t, i) (x, t, i) k if j x. Next, for each l k (), we define two special parameters:
Let the ordered triple values at g * k and g be denoted by (j * , t * , i * ) k and (ĵ,t,î) k , respectively, i.e
. Note that (ĵ,t,î) (j * , t * , i * ) since both l k (x + z) and xl k (x) are increasing in j and hence by definition of the ordered triple (x, y, z) k we must have g k g * k . We consider three disjoint subclasses of latency functions from L as described below and evaluate their P oA bounds.
• L 2 = {l k ∈ L|l k (x) = a k · e log 1+ǫ x }, where ǫ > 0 is any constant, coefficient a k > 0 and log refers to the natural logarithm. The functions in L 2 are superpolynomials with the property lim x→∞
• L 3 is the class of non-superpolynomial increasing functions inclusive of and bounded from above by polynomials, for example,
Our first result is an exact bound on the Price of Anarchy of unsplittable congestion games. 
As a corollary from above note that every game G has a P oA lower bounded by the maximum value of g k at an ordered triple, i.e P oA = Ω(g * k ) since the expression above equates to g * k when j = x for any (x, t, i) k ∈ O k . Theorem 1 compactly describes a necessary and sufficient condition for the boundedness of the Price of Anarchy of any game with cost functions drawn from L. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exact formulation of Price of Anarchy bounds (both lower and upper bounds) for unsplittable congestion games with arbitrary latency cost functions. Previous results by Awerbuch et al. and Monien et al. [3, 1] have provided a tight characterization for games with polynomial latency cost functions. In [21] , Roughgarden provides generalized existence conditions for the Price of Anarchy of congestion games using smoothness characterizations. We demonstrate in this paper for every superpolynomial cost function in L 1 and L 2 , the existence of games for which the P oA is unbounded and also provide a tight bound on the P oA for all games polynomially bounded latency costs. Result 2 directly relates the Price of Anarchy of unsplittable congestion games to the growth rates of the latency cost functions that control the player costs in these games. More significantly, it has strongly negative implications for the Price of Anarchy of many such games. These implications were heretofore unknown, as the only known results to date were on the Price of Anarchy of congestion games with polynomial cost functions.
Our result implies that the Price of Anarchy is finite only for those games with latency cost functions bounded by some polynomial. Latency costs growing faster than polynomial functions have strongly negative consequences for the Price of Anarchy of every game with player costs controlled by these functions. For every cost function in this class, there are games with unbounded Price of Anarchy, even if the weights of all players are infinitesimally small.
Remark: The P oA is bounded for all games with latency functions from L 3 such as the wellknown polynomial cost functions [3, 1] 
We show in this paper that the P oA is bounded even for other polynomial bounded functions, for example,
The verdict on the existence of the Price of Anarchy for games with faster growing cost functions is strongly negative. This includes both slowly growing super-polynomial cost functions such as l k (x) = a k x log ǫ x , ǫ > 0 as well as fast-growing exponential cost functions such as l k (x) = x! and l k (x) = a x , where a > 1.
Game Formulation
An unsplittable congestion game is a strategic game G = (Π, W, R, S, (l r ) r∈R ) where:
• Π = {π 1 , . . . , π N } is a non-empty and finite set of players.
• Player weight set W ∈ R + where each player π i has an associated weight w π i ∈ W (also denoted as i later in the analysis), and the maximum player weight is w = max π i ∈Π w π i .
• R = {r 1 , . . . , r ζ } is a non-empty and finite set of resources.
• Strategy profile S = S π 1 × S π 2 × · · · × S π N , where S π i is a strategy set for player π i , such that S π i ⊆ 2 R . Each strategy S π i ∈ S π i is pure in the sense that it is a single element from S π i (in contrast to a mixed strategy which is a probability distribution over the strategy set of the player). A game state is any S ∈ S. We consider finite games which have finite S (finite number of states).
In any game state S, let S π i denote the strategy of player π i . We define the following terms with respect to a state S: Congestion: Each resource r ∈ R has a congestion C r (S) = π i ∈Π∧r∈Sπ i w π i , which is the sum of the weights of the players that use it. Utility: In any game state S, each resource r ∈ R has a utility cost (also referred to as latency cost) l r (S). Player Cost: In any game state S, each player π ∈ Π G has a player cost pc π i (S) = r∈Sπ i l r (S). Social Cost: In any game state S, the social cost is SC(S) = r∈R l r (C r (S))·C r (S). Note that the social cost is the weighted sum of the player's costs.
When the context is clear, we will drop the dependence on S. For any state S, we use the standard notation S = (S π i , S −π i ) to emphasize the dependence on player
A greedy move by a player π i is any change of its strategy from S ′ π i to S π i which improves the player's cost, that is,
A state S is in a Nash Equilibrium if every player is locally optimal, namely, no greedy move is available for any player. A Nash Equilibrium realizes the notion of a stable selfish outcome. In the games that we study there could exist multiple Nash Equilibria.
A state S * is called optimal if it has minimum attainable social cost: for any other state S, SC(S * ) ≤ SC(S). We quantify the quality of the states which are Nash Equilibria with the price of anarchy (P oA) (sometimes referred to as the coordination ratio). Let P denote the set of distinct Nash Equilibria. Then the price of anarchy of game G is:
Preliminaries
Let S denote an arbitrary (not necessarily an equilibrium) state of game G with resource set R. We group resources in R together based on congestion and cost parameters. Let R t j,k ⊆ R denote an equivalence class of resources such that for every r ∈ R t j,k , we have C r (S) = j, C r (S * ) = t and latency costs governed by function l k (C r (S)) ∈ L i.e the cost of using r ∈ R t j,k in states S and S * are given by l k (j) and l k (t), respectively. For notational convenience, we label the set of resource equivalence classes by E = {R t j,k }. For any resource r ∈ R, let Π r = {π|r ∈ S π } and Π * r = {π|r ∈ S * π }. Let σ i ⊆ Π denote the set of players in Π with weight i, 0 < i w and let α ir = |σ i Π * r | denote the number of players of weight i utilizing resource r in the optimal state S * . Thus i:σ i =φ i · α ir = t for all r ∈ R t j,k . For any t > 0, let f (t) be the total number of combinations of players of different weights which can satisfy the equation i:σ i =φ i · α ir = t, where f (t) can be an exponential function of t. We denote a particular such player combination by the index t a , 1 a f (t) and let R ta j,k ⊆ R t j,k denote the equivalence class of resources with identical configurations of players in the optimal state as represented by t a . If t = 0, we will sometimes use the notation 0 0 to denote the empty configuration. We represent the optimal configuration in state S * on any resource r ∈ R ta j,k , by the vectorL ta j,k =< {α i,ta j,k } >, where α i,ta j,k > 0 denotes the number of players of weight i in configuration t a on resource r in optimal state S * . Henceforth we use the notation i ∈L ta j,k to denote the presence of a player of weight i in configuration t a , i.e if α i,ta j,k > 0. We derive our P oA bound by obtaining a constrained maximization formulation of the P oA using resource equivalence classes that can then be bounded. In particular, consider the term |R ta j,k |iα i,ta j,k l k (t) representing resource equivalence class R ta j,k . This term represents the net contribution of all players of a given weight i occupying the subset of resources R ta j,k towards the optimal social cost. More formally define the terms
Each term of Eq. 5 represents the fractional net contribution of players of weight i occupying resources in R ta j,k with t > 0 towards the optimal social cost SC(S * ). However as shown in the lemma below, these terms also represent exactly the contribution of these players towards the total Price of Anarchy. Also, Eq. 6 is defined for arbitrary i for consistency with Eq. 5, however in actuality i can be assumed 0 since there are no players of any weight on resources in R 0 j,k in the optimal state.
Denote the coordination ratio of any unsplittable congestion game G as H(S) = SC(S)/SC(S * ) for arbitrary state S and optimal state S * . The following lemma relates the coordination ratio to the coefficients λ i,ta j,k . Lemma 1. Given any game state S, the coordination ratio H(S) of an unsplittable congestion game with latency cost functions derived from class L can be expressed as
where
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Let P denote the set of Nash equilibrium states of G. Then from the definition of the Price of Anarchy, we have P oA(G) = max
Note that for any group of resources R t j,k , the term
tl k (t) represents the localized P oA. Thus given constraint 8 we can also view the overall P oA of the game as the average of the localized P oA's on each resource class. Also note that while the λ i,ta j,k , t > 0, terms representing actual optimal player configurations are constrained, the λ 0,0 j,k terms representing resources contributing to the equilibrium cost but not the optimal are not. However as shown later they cannot be too large.
Price of Anarchy Lower Bounds
For any arbitrary cost function in L, we describe a specific game which bounds the Price of Anarchy from below. Consider a game G = (Π, W, R, S, l k ), where l k ∈ L and players Π = {π 1 , . . . , π N } such that every player has a demand of weight exactly w ∈ W . The set of resources R, where ζ = |R|, can be divided into two disjoint sets R = A ∪ B, A ∩ B = ∅, such that A = {a 0 , . . . , a ζ 1 −1 } and
Consider 
. We consider the game state S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) which consists of the first strategy of each player, and game state S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) which consists of the second strategy of each player. We take the number of players N = κ 1 ζ 1 and N = κ 2 ζ 2 , for integers κ 1 , κ 2 ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. State S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Please see Appendix. As observed in the proof of Lemma 2, in state S each resource r ∈ A has congestion equal to j 1 = C r (S) = N αw/ζ 1 , and each resource r ∈ B has congestion equal to j 2 = C r (S) = N βw/ζ 2 . Similarly, in state S each resource r ∈ A has congestion equal to t 1 = C r (S) = N γw/ζ 1 , and each resource r ∈ B has congestion equal to t 2 = C r (S) = N δw/ζ 2 . Similar to the previous section, we define parameters λ 1 , λ 2 ≥ 0, such that λ 1 + λ 2 = 1 and:
.
From Lemma 2, we have that S is a Nash equilibrium, and thus, for any player i, pc
With an appropriate choice of the game parameters (α, β, γ, δ, ζ 1 , ζ 2 , κ 1 , κ 2 ) and also by adjusting the weight w which is a real number, we can actually get pc π i (S) = pc π i (S ′ ) for each player π i ∈ Π. In other words,
Therefore,
and hence,
or equivalently,
which gives,
Lemma 3. For game G, the price of anarchy is bounded by:
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Price of Anarchy Upper Bounds
Constrained Maximization
Let S be any Nash equilibrium state of G. We find the upper bound on the P oA via the lemma below in which we convert the unconstrained maximization of Eq. 7 into a constrained version.
Consider an arbitrary resource equivalence class R ta j,k in state S of G. For any player of weight i ∈L ta j,k , 0 < i min(t, w), define
Also let g It can be seen that the first term in the definition of f i,ta j,k above is related to the overall social cost of players using resource class R ta j,k while the second term is related to the cost of a player of weight i switching to a resource in R ta j,k from its current strategy. Thus the magnitude of the function f i,ta j,k is an indicator of the contribution of the corresponding resource class R t j,k to the overall Price of Anarchy and also indicates the excess load over the switching costs in that resource class. However for any equilibrium state S, the switching costs must exceed the players costs when taken over all resource classes and thus the weight of the overloaded resource classes must be constrained by the underloaded resource classes, as we show through the lemma below.
Lemma 4. Let S ∈ P be any Nash equilibrium state of game G. Then we must have,
Next in order to bound the P oA objective function, we relate the functions f i,ta j,k and g i,ta j,k above to the ordered triples of any latency function l k (). From the definition of ordered triples in Eq. 1, we obtain
Rewriting lemma 4 using lemma 5 above and combining with Eq. 10, the upper bound on the P oA can therefore be expressed as the following constrained maximization:
The following lemma provides an exact formulation for evaluating the upper bound on the P oA of any game G by bounding the objective function H(S) for any equilibrium state S.
P oA: Functional Characterizations
Now we can combine the lower and upper bounds for the P oA as derived in lemma 3 and lemma 6 to get the tight bounds described in Eq. 1 of Result 1. Next we bound the expression in Eq. 1 for arbitrary latency functions l k (). Proof. First consider the following example where i = 1 and l k (x + 1) > xl k (x) (for example, latency functions such as l k (x) = x! or l k (x) = x x ). Note that in these cases, ordered triples do not exist since tl k (x + 1) > xl k (x) for all t 1. For such functions, g k = max x,t 1
is unbounded and therefore so is g * k . Since the P oA g * k it is also unbounded. Consider a more general example of latency functions in L 1 where ordered triples exist. Given any i > 0, let lim x→∞ l k (x+i) l k (x) = 1 + δ, δ > 0 is a constant independent of t. Choose an ordered triple (x, t, i) such that tl k (x + i) = xl k (x) and l k (x + i) (1 + δ)l k (x). Thus x (1 + δ)t. Substituting in the expression for the P oA above with j = x, we have the P oA
From Section 5, since t is controlled by the number of players in the game which can be arbitrarily large while player weight i is bounded by a given constant w, the P oA is unbounded.
Theorem 2. For every latency function l k ∈ L 2 , there exist congestion games with arbitrarily large P oA depending only on the number of players.
Proof. Let t 0 ∈ R + be a sufficiently large constant. Consider ordered triples (x, t, i) k ∈ O k with t t 0 , x t, for cost function l k () ∈ L 2 . We can safely assume that
is bounded for all t t 0 , else the P oA is unbounded as
κ for all t t 0 or equivalently log 1+ǫ x − log 1+ǫ t log κ, ∀t t 0
Also lim x→∞ l k (x + i)/l k (x) = 1 and l k (x + i)/l k (x) = x/t, which implies ∃ǫ t → 0 such that
Since g * k is assumed bounded and jl k (j) > tl k (j + i) for all j x : (x, t, i) k ∈ O k , we can bound the P oA expression in Eq. 1 as
Denote the term above by y. Taking the partial derivative of y with respect to j and equating it to 0 gives us
where () ′ denotes the partial derivative with respect to j. For any given value of t : (x, t, i) k ∈ O k , y is maximized for j x that satisfies Eq. 21 Substituting this in Eq. 20 and simplifying we get P oA max
Similarly Eq. 21 can be simplified as
where β = (1 + ǫ) g k is a constant dependent only on the parameters of latency function l k (x). Since j ≥ x where (x, t, i) k is an ordered triple, let j = γx where γ 1 and x = (1 + ǫ t )t as defined earlier. Substituting in Eq. 24, we get
⇒ log γ + (log γ + log x) 1+ǫ − log 1+ǫ t log β + ǫ log log(2γx)
⇒ log γ + ǫ ′ log γ log x + log 1+ǫ x − log 1+ǫ t log β + ǫ log log(2γx)
where ǫ ′ is a constant. Further substituting from Eq. 19, we get,
⇒ log γ ζ + ǫ log log 2γx
where ζ is a constant. Since ǫ, ǫ ′ and ζ are constants and x can be chosen to be x ≫ i, we have log γ = Θ( log log x log x ) and so γ = Θ(1 + log log x log x ). Substituting for j/t = (1 + ǫ t )γ in Eq. 23 we notice that all the terms in the first expression on the RHS converge to 1. Further substituting this expression in Eq. 22 for the P oA, we get P oA = Ω((1 + ǫ) log ǫ j). Since the congestion j depends on the number of players and can be arbitrarily large, we get the result as desired.
Finally we consider games from L 3 .
[1] describes upper bounds for games with polynomial costs.
Here we we present a generalized result for all congestion games with latency functions drawn from the class of polynomially bounded functions. 
Conclusions
We provide the first characterization for the price of anarchy of superpolynomial utilities in congestion games. We provide tight bounds for a large family of utility functions and show how the price of anarchy increases with the number of players, while other game parameters such as number of resources and player weights remain fixed. We also extend and generalize the previously known bounds on games with polynomial utility functions to games with utility functions inclusive of and bounded above by polynomials. Our results lead to several interesting open questions: by restricting player strategy sets and network topologies, can we find interesting families of games with bounded price of anarchy even with superpolynomial utilities? Another interesting problem is to determine whether there are approximate games with bounded P oA.
A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: After substituting the values of λ i,ta j,k from Eqs. 5 and Eq. 6 into the coordination ratio H(S) in Eq. 7, we get,
where we use the fact that i∈L
j,k = t for all values of optimal congestion t > 0. Similarly, to prove constraint 8, note that
Proof of lemma 2:
Since N is a multiple of ζ 1 and ζ 2 , in state S each resource in A is utilized by N α/ζ 1 = κ 1 α players, and each resource in B is utilized by N β/ζ 2 = κ 2 β players. Therefore,
Let S ′ = (s i , S −π i ) denote the state derived from S when player π i switches its strategy from s to s. Since s i ∩ s i = ∅, each resource in r ∈ s i will have congestion C r (S ′ ) = C r (S) + w, where player π i adds weight w to r, while every other resource in R will have the same congestion in both states. Consequently,
In order to prove that S is a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that pc π i (S ′ ) − pc π i (S) ≥ 0. We have,
Therefore, we only need to show that:
If α · l k (κ 1 αw) − γ · l k (κ 1 αw + w) ≤ 0, then by taking δ = β, since l k is a non-decreasing function, we get δ · l k (κ 2 βw + w) − β · l k (κ 2 βw) ≥ 0; hence, Eq. 28 holds. If α · l k (κ 1 αw) − γ · l k (κ 1 αw + w) > 0, then by setting β = β ′ ζ 2 /ζ 1 , and δ = δ ′ ζ 2 /ζ 1 , for some β ′ , δ ′ ≥ 0, and we get:
Then, Eq. 28, is equivalent to:
For taking ζ 2 ≥ κ 1 αζ 1 , and by setting δ ′ and β ′ such that δ ′ − β ′ ≥ (α − γ)/(κ 1 α), we get:
as needed. ✷ Proof of lemma 3: From Lemma 2, state S is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, P oA(G) ≥ SC(S) SC(S) = r∈R l k (C r (S)) r∈R l k (C r (S)) = r∈A j 1 l k (j 1 ) + r∈B j 2 l k (j 2 ) r∈A t 1 l k (t 1 ) + r∈B t 2 l k (t 2 )
Since λ 1 + λ 2 = 1, from Eq. 11 we can get that
and g k is obtained from Eq. 3 such that it maximizes
Consequently,
and l k (j + i) represents the cost to each such player of switching to resource r while all other players remain in state S. The left term of Eq. 33 represents i times the cost to a player of weight i of any resource in R in state S while the right term represents i times the switching cost to any resource in R t j,k summed up over all resources. Eq. 34 represents the summation of player costs in state S and the switching cost to state S * over all resources and then over all players. Finally Eq. 35 follows since S is a Nash equilibrium.
✷ From the definition of g * k in Eq. 2 and using jl k (j) < tl k (j + i) for all (j, t, i) < (x, t, i) k along with constraint 17, we have Lemma 7. R ta j,k ∈E i∈L ta j,k (j,t,i)<(x,t,i) k
